

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: ASAT TALKS: WARNKE STATEMENT OF JUNE 9, 1978

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMB. WARNKE
AT SECOND PLENARY MEETING OF ASAT TALKS, ON JUNE 9, 1978:

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WARNKE
JUNE 9, 1978

I

WE ARE PLEASED TO BE MEETING AGAIN WITH THE SOVIET
DELEGATION TODAY. YESTERDAY'S MEETING WAS STIMULATING AND
THOUGHT-PROVOKING, AND PRODUCED INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF
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EACH SIDE'S VIEWS ON THE ISSUES BEFORE US.

YESTERDAY I BRIEFLY REVIEWED THE IMPORTANCE OF SATELLITES
FOR A WIDE VARIETY OF PURPOSES. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS
ANY DISAGREEMENT THAT SATELLITES MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO
THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES.

OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL NOW HAVE TO MAKE A CHOICE WHICH
WILL AFFECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN SPACE FOR MANY YEARS TO

COME. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP, TEST, AND DEPLOY WITHOUT CONSTRAINT INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED AND EFFECTIVE WEAPONS FOR DAMAGING AND DESTROYING SATELLITES. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY, AND THE ONE THE U.S. PREFERS, WOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT TO LIMIT ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES.

THE ESSENCE OF WHAT I SAID TO YOU YESTERDAY IS THAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN WORKING TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT THAT NOT ONLY LIMITS THE USE OF SYSTEMS FOR DAMAGING SATELLITES, BUT ALSO PROHIBITS THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS DESIGNED FOR THIS PURPOSE AND ELIMINATES ANY SYSTEMS THAT ALREADY EXIST FOR THIS PURPOSE.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONDUCTED A SERIES OF TESTS OF AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM. WE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY EXPLANATION OTHER THAN THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE SOVIET TESTS INCLUDES THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPABILITY TO THREATEN IMPORTANT U.S. SATELLITES. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING FROM THE SOVIET SIDE ABOUT THESE TESTS.

THE U.S., OF COURSE, HAS THE ABILITY TO MATCH THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS NEW AREA OF SPACE WEAPONARY. HISTORICALLY, NEITHER SIDE HAS INTRODUCED A SIGNIFICANT NEW TYPE OF WEAPON WHICH HAS NOT BEEN MATCHED BY THE OTHER. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY BE THE CASE FOR ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT HAVE A MONOPOLY ON SUCH WEAPONS. THE U.S. IS DETERMINED THAT THE CURRENT ASYMMETRY IN ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES WILL NOT CONTINUE; THAT IS, EITHER WE WILL HAVE
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OUR OWN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS OR NEITHER SIDE WILL HAVE ANY SUCH SYSTEM.

THE SOVIET EXPERIMENTS WITH AN ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITY COULD BE A FIRST STEP IN AN ARMS COMPETITION LEADING TO THE POSSESSION ON BOTH SIDES OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS WHICH THREATEN EACH COUNTRY'S SATELLITES. THE ALTERNATIVE, WHICH THE U.S. WOULD PREFER, WOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT TO LIMIT THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE RETENTION OF ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITY AS WELL AS THE USE OF SUCH SYSTEMS TO DAMAGE OR DESTROY SATELLITES. IN OUR VIEW, THE GOAL OF THESE DISCUSSIONS IS TO ACHIEVE SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN A FASHION WHICH PRECLUDES ANY SIGNIFICANT ASYMMETRY IN ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITY.

YESTERDAY, YOU NOTED THAT OUR COUNTRIES HAVE COOPERATED IN A NUMBER OF SPACE VENTURES. OUR EXPERIENCE IN SUCH ACTIVITIES AUGURS WELL FOR COOPERATION IN EFFORTS AIMED AT PREVENTING ATTACKS ON SATELLITES AND LIMITED ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES.

I WAS ALSO PLEASED TO HEAR YOU CONFIRM YOUR INTEREST IN A SERIOUS EFFORT TO CURB THIS NEW DIMENSION OF THE ARMS RACE BEFORE IT BECOMES AN INSUPERABLE PROBLEM -- BEFORE ARSENALS OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BY BOTH SIDES.

II

YESTERDAY YOU ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS, INCLUDING QUESTIONS REGARDING DEFINITIONS. WHILE AT THIS PRELIMINARY STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE U.S. DOES NOT HAVE FIXED VIEWS ON THESE QUESTIONS, AND DOES NOT HAVE PROPOSALS TO MAKE, I AGREE THAT IT IS USEFUL TO TALK ABOUT WHAT WE MEAN BY THE TERMS WE USE.

BY "ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM" WE MEAN A COLLECTION OF PIECES OF EQUIPMENT FOR DAMAGING OR DESTROYING SATELLITES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF AN INTERCEPT SYSTEM THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE INTERCEPTOR, THE LAUNCH VEHICLE, AND ASSOCIATED GROUND FACILITIES.

YOU ASKED ABOUT CAPTURING A SATELLITE, OR CHANGING ITS
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ORBIT, WITHOUT DAMAGING OR DESTROYING IT. IN THE U.S. VIEW, CAPTURING OR ALTERING THE ORBIT OF A SATELLITE BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE, EVEN IF IT WERE LATER RETURNED TO ITS PREVIOUS ORBIT, WOULD BE AN UNACCEPTABLE ACTION AND SHOULD BE PROHIBITED, WHETHER OR NOT THE SATELLITE WERE DAMAGED. WE COULD ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TWO SIDES MIGHT AGREE, FOR REASONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, THAT ONE SIDE COULD CHANGE TO ORBIT OF ONE OF THE OTHER SIDE'S SATELLITES. ANY AGREEMENT COULD INCLUDE AN UNDERSTANDING TO PERMIT SUCH COOPERATION.

YOU ALSO ASKED YESTERDAY WHETHER WE WERE CONCERNED ONLY WITH DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION RESULTING ONLY FROM PHYSICAL CONTACT. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ANY ACTION WHICH RESULTS IN DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION OF A SATELLITE OF THE OTHER SIDE, HOWEVER IT IS INFLECTED.

YOUR QUESTIONS YESTERDAY WERE HELPFUL. THEY INITIATED A USEFUL DIALOGUE WHICH HAS ADVANCED THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE APPROACHES OF BOTH SIDES. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THIS POSITIVE BEGINNING, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THE ISSUES BEFORE US.

RIDGWAY

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